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ABSTRACT  
 
The personal status laws in Egypt have been subject to considerable debate. Between 
Feminists and Islamists; these are some who call for reforms and those who call for 
the return to the Shari’a. In spite of the differences, the constant in this debate has 
been the knowledge that the personal status laws are divine. This paper challenges 
this narrative through examining the historical development of the Shari’a as a whole 
then move on to specific aspects of the personal status law, namely, divorce and child 
custody. It argues that the personal status law have been altered and modified through 
decades, and shifted from the original form of the Shari’a law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The personal status laws in Egypt have always been labeled as religious, hence divine 
in nature, and unchanged through time. This thesis primarily discusses the notion of 
the divinity of these laws, and provides an insight into how these laws developed over 
time. This development was sometimes due to individual interpretations, at some 
other times as a result of sovereign intervention, and lasts, due to civilizations’ 
collisions. The paper will trace these changes in two particular legal domains in 
contemporary Egypt: divorce and child custody. 
This thesis begins with a review of the literature that reflects as the “common 
knowledge” regarding the Egyptian legal system in both scholarly literature produced 
within Egypt, and abroad. Most of these opinions and intellectual findings point to 
one claim: the Egyptian legal system is a dual system; meaning religious laws 
represented by Shari’a deal with personal status issues, while secular laws 
represented by man made laws deal with the rest of the legal field. The advocates of 
this narrative claim that there is no point in time when both legal systems overlapped.  
This thesis argues that the Egyptian personal status laws are not divine. They are not 
holy in nature. Throughout history, they have been changed, altered, modified, and 
tampered with. This modern version of the personal status law has little, and in some 
instances nothing to do with the original form of the Shari’a law that existed prior to 
the modernization era. The modern version is detached from the past, primarily 
influenced by the social and political changes that occurred throughout the past 
decades. In reality, these laws are inspired by religion, yet they are far from where 
they started, and probably far from what the legislator intended them to be. This is 
mainly because, Shari’a law, in general, has never existed in a vacuum. It has always 
been a form of human made laws to either complete or complement it, hence assisting 
in adapting it to the societal needs.  
Chapter one discusses the history of the legal system in Egypt as a backdrop to 
understanding when and how the Shari’a in general, and the personal status laws 
specifically, developed. Contrary to some scholars’ opinion, it will be shown that 
Shari’a has always been flexible in nature, accommodating the changes in its 
environment and society. The infused nature of the legal system during the pre-
modern era will be manifested via the existence of Shari’a and Seyasa tools; which 
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coexist to complement each other rather than contradict each other. Then, the chapter 
concluded with the start of the codification efforts, which stripped away the Shari’a 
from its most significant aspect, namely its flexibility to adapt to time and place.  
After going through chapter one, it will be evident that: one, the Shari’a has always 
been changing, and adaptable; two, Seyasa, which is a secular tool, was introduced by 
the sovereign powers in an attempt to legitimize their intervention in the passing of 
laws, and gradually became an essential tool to complement Shari’a across different 
areas of the law; three, Codification of laws resulted in more distance from Shari’a, 
and less flexibility in general to abide by it.   
Chapter two details the personal status law: child custody, and divorce legislation. 
First, the real start of the personal status laws straying away from Shari’a and its 
principles came about due to foreign intervention. A clear and striking example is the 
introduction of the patriarchal concept into the Egyptian legal system, a concept, 
contrary to common knowledge in the Egyptian society, which was predominantly 
conceived from the Napoleonic Code. This chapter will make clear how the 
codification affected the personal status law. Also, it will shed light on child custody 
legislation and how, in the pre-modern era, the ’Urf and customs often affected the 
qadi’s ruling. It will also show how, in the post-modern era, legislation included 
concepts that are not necessarily derived from Shari’a.  The divorce legislation will 
also demonstrate the differences between the pre and post-modern era.   
To conclude, the application of the Shari’a has always had a secular tool that 
complemented it. There has been no point in the Egyptian legal history when the 
Shari’a has been strictly adhered to and applied solely. Hence, it is evident that the 
personal status laws that govern Egyptian daily lives are far from being divine, and 
unchanged.   
  3 
I. Historical Background 
It is considered common knowledge, across all social and economic classes, that the 
personal status laws are solely based on religion.  No one questions that knowledge. 
That is the most exceptional aspect of the Muslim society.
1
 
As a woman growing up with such knowledge, you cannot help but associate your 
rights as a subject in the society with religion. The danger of this knowledge and such 
association lies in two respects: the first aspect is the acceptance this commonalty 
creates: the acceptance by women of these laws and the position these laws dictate on 
them in society. The second aspect is the danger that lies in the association with 
religion, which makes challenging these laws equal to challenging religion itself and 
Allah’s will. Thus, any attempt at changing or reforming the personal status law 
would amounts to an attack on the principles of Islam. 
2  
Moreover, law books authored in Egypt distinguish between those laws that apply to 
personal status issues and laws that apply to other issues. One professor, Ali Negeda, 
explains in his book, Rules of Islamic Shari’a, that there is a difference between the 
laws that govern personal status issues and the rest of the laws that govern the 
criminal, civil and maritime issues. He goes on to explain that the statutory laws of 
Egypt govern the financial aspects of the state, and any other aspect, except issues of 
personal status laws. According to professor Negeda, personal status laws for 
Muslims and non-Muslims have always been adjudicated according to the Islamic 
Shari’a for Muslims. As for Christians and Jews, their respective laws are inspired by 
their own respective religions. In his book, he also defines the personal status law, as 
the law that solely adjudicates all matters relating to the family, from marriage, 
divorce, custody, adoption and inheritance. 
3
  
Much of the literature produced on this subject, particularly literature authored in the 
English language, uses the term Muslim law to describe laws applicable in Muslim 
                                                        
1 Amira Al Azhary Sonbol, Questing Exceptionalism: Shari’a Law, 77 ASJ, 6, 1 (1998). available at 
http://www.jstore.org/stable/41969121. 
2 Amira El Azhary Sonbol, The Genesis of Family Law; how Shari’a, Custom and Colonial Laws 
Influenced the Development of Personal Status Codes, 179, available at 
www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/Wanted-AEAS-EN-2ed.pdf. 
3  ALI NEGEDA, RULES OF ISLAMIC SHARI’A, (1998). 
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countries. This term refers to the combination of both Shari’a and Fiqh.4 In the book 
Major Legal Systems in the World Today, Rene David further explains that the 
Muslim legal systems are derived purely from Islam, mainly the Quran. This makes 
the Muslim law completely different from any other legal system. The nature of the 
Islamic legal system makes it impossible to have any European influence, and vice 
versa.
5
  The book does acknowledge that the Muslim world has positive laws, yet 
makes an interesting and relevant observation that “all the branches of the Muslim 
law are linked to the Islamic religion with equal force, a distinction has to be made in 
practice. The law of the family and persons has always been considered the most 
important in the Shari’a.6 There were some aspects of the European influence of 
course, yet the connection between the religion and law was not broken. For example, 
the constitutional law of almost every Muslim country, and in the case of Egypt has 
always included adherence to Islamic law. 
7
  
 
The contribution of the “Western Scholarship” to the understanding of the 
development of the Muslim legal history has not been accurate. Enid Hill criticizes 
“Western scholarship” on the Middle East, which focuses on Islamic law and its 
modernization either through studying the historical texts and institutions, or the 
history of Islamic law. However, the legal systems of the Middle East are more 
complicated than that. The law in the Middle East is a combination of Islamic law and 
European adopted codes, as well as national legislation.
8
 Yet, Hill ascertains that the 
authors that were interested in a deeper understanding of the law in the Middle East 
were able to distinguish that the family law and inheritance law were strictly adhering 
to the rule of Islamic law.
9 
 
 
                                                        
4 The difference between Shari’a and Fiqh will be illustrated later. 
5  DAVID RENE, JOHN E C BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 463 (Les Grand Systemes de 
Driot Contemporian, London Stevens 1985) (1978). 
6 Id at 474. 
7 Id at 474. 
8 Enid Hill, ABB.  279, 26, 2, Proceedings of an International Conference on Comparative Law, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. February 24-25, 1977 (Spring, 1978), 279-304, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/839675.. 
9 Id at 280. 
  5 
Coulson also, criticizes the western scholars describing the development of the 
Islamic jurisprudence as non-existent, and a law divorced from historical 
development.
10 
 As the revealed will of God,
11
 hence the Shari’a has been dominant in  
Muslim territories, yet static and only adapted itself to the internal needs of its 
society. The Islamic jurisprudence cannot be measured against any societal historical 
development. It has been controlling Muslim societies and not being controlled by the 
Muslim societies.
12
 The lack of this historical developments attributed to the nature of 
the Sharia’a and the role of the jurists. The latter is measured against the discovery of 
the divine commandment and not measured against any external factors of the society. 
As for the Shari’a and since the revelation ceased with the death of the prophet 
Muhammad, it was hence immutable.
13
  To the Western Scholars in conclusion,  
Islamic law lacks the dimension of the historical development.
14
Yet when Muslim 
countries were faced with the Western laws of political, economic and institutional 
laws that were foreign to the Islamic law and its Shari’a, there was no other option 
before them but the desire to change to be closer to the European model. 
15
 Hence the 
development of the Islamic legal system intersects with the emergence of the western 
laws in Islamic territories.
16
 So modern European laws saved the Islamic antiquated 
laws from their inadequacy to adapt to the modern systems of economics and trade.
17
 
As a result of the capitulations in the Ottoman era, the Islamic territories had to adopt 
the European version of the criminal and commercial laws.
18
  The commercial code in 
1850 and the penal code in 1858 were both direct translation from the French code, In 
addition to the commercial procedural code in 1861, and the maritime code in 1863. 
19
 
As a result, the modern codes replaced entirely parts of Islamic laws such as the penal 
code.
20
 
                                                        
10 Noel Coulson, A history of Islamic law, 4, available at www.books.google.com. 
11 Id at 1.  
12 Id at 2. 
13 Id at 2. 
14 Id at 2. 
15 Id at 149. 
16 Id at 150. 
17 Id at 150.  
18 Id at 151. 
19 Id at 151.  
20 Id at 151. 
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The danger of this contention lies in the following; first, the advocates of this line of 
thought imply, and cement the idea that the personal status law is solely based on 
religion. Second, is the notion that there was a time when laws in Egypt were solely 
based on the Islamic Shari’a.  
This chapter will demonstrate that, in the pre-modern era, the personal status law did 
not strictly adhere to Shari’a law. Furthermore, in the post modern-era after the 
French invasion of Egypt in 1798, the paper will demonstrate that the European 
influence did affect the personal status laws in Egypt. Mainly, the French law was the 
force behind the patriarchal laws that affected negatively the rights of women in 
marriage, divorce and child custody; this was followed by the intervention of the 
modernists in the 20
th
 century which eventually led to significant changes in the 
personal status laws.  
In addition, One of the many problems, which may have created a misconception 
about Islamic legal history is the contribution of the Western academic scholars and 
their definition of Islamic legal history.
21
 The historians primarily concentrate on the 
divine revealed scriptures of the Quran and the Sunnah.
22
 The best way to describe 
some of the historian’s work on the history of Islam in general would be the term 
“scriptuarlism”,23 which would means, that the historian’s main focus is on the norms 
of the divine scripture of the Quran and Sunnah, excluding all other aspects of the law 
such as criminal justice, administrative, or any political norms that carried on at the 
time.
24
 The danger of this approach is giving the impression that legal reform 
happened outside the realm of religion, cementing the notion of the duality of the law.   
The truth about Islamic jurisprudence is that it is a legal system just like civil law or 
common law in terms of complexity. It is common in the literature on the subject to 
distinguish between secular legal systems and Islamic law by claiming that Islamic 
law is the command of a divine entity and as for the secular law it is the commands of 
a human entity.
25
 These claims have some truth to them, yet they are considered an 
                                                        
21 Id at 4.  
 Id at 6.  
23 Id at 6.  
24 Id at 6.  
25 KHALED ABOU EL FADL, The Great Theft, Wrestling Islam From The Extremists, 30 (first 
edition, New York, NY, Harper San Francisco 2005) (2005). 
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oversimplification of the importance of human agency in the production of Islamic 
law.
26
 Islamic law, unlike its secular counterpart, covers a range of issues, from the 
relationship between humans and God, to matters that relate to social and political 
interactions, and generally the relationship between human beings and each other.
27
 
The first chapter in the thesis deals with the development of the Islamic legal history, 
and attempts to clear few misconceptions:
28
 First, is the perceived lack of 
development throughout the Islamic legal history. Second, is the notion that Shari’a 
dominated the legal arena until the emergence of the European laws. Scholars often 
ignored the connection between Islamic law and the Seyasa, which sheds light on the 
dynamics of the legal system and its development before the emergence of the 
European laws. Through the concept of Seyasa and its connection to the Shari’a, it 
will be clear that both have always existed, yet never separately.    
A. Development of Islamic Legal History - Shari’a and Fiqh 
To some scholars, Fiqh, or “Islamic jurisprudence” is the framework used  to refer to 
the Shari’a’s sources, namely the Quran and the Sunnah. Later in the paper, the main 
differences between Shari’a and Fiqh will be elaborated on. It is safe to state that 
scholars have regarded the Fiqh as unchangeable and unable to adapt to societal 
changes.
29
 The Sunni Fiqh, for example, was formulated by four schools in a period 
which is known as the Taqlid period of Fiqh.
30
 Within this period all the fatwas and 
the legal opinions rendered had to be issued by previous jurists. To historian and 
scholars, this made the Islamic law only connected to the history of God, whose 
sources were restricted to the Quran, Sunnah or Ijma’. 31  To Western historians, 
Islamic legal history was frozen in time from the tenth century up until the Napoleon 
invasion of Egypt in 1798.  
                                                        
26 Id.  
27 Id at 31.  
28 Amr el Shalakany, Islamic legal history, ABB,7,1, Article 1. (2008). 
29  KHALED FAHMY & RUDOLPH PETERS, The Legal History of Ottoman Egypt, ABB. 129, 6,2 
(1999) www.jstore.org/stable/3399309. 
30 SHALAKANY, supra note 28, at 13. 
31 Id at 14.  
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Schacht’s general idea is that Islamic law was limited to personal status law, and in 
some cases a limited presence of the Islamic law could be present in other aspects of 
the legal system, i.e; the constitutional law, taxation law, penal codes and so on. As 
for the contractual obligations, they received a partial application of the Shari’a 
throughout the Islamic history. Schacht claims that in the private law section though 
there was the ’Urf, Hhyal and Shurut.32 With the assistance of Fiqh, those customary 
practices and conditions, were turned into contractual obligations. Hence Schacht 
reaches the conclusion that these areas of the law were a collective effort between the 
Fiqh and institutional structures, as Schacht describes them “secular” laws.33 
For example: in the pre modern courts, qadis belonged to various jurisprudential 
schools (Madhaheb). The qadis would use these Madhaheb as a guide and, in court, 
they would rule based on the ’Urf and customs of the community.34 It will be clear in 
the child custody section , chapter two, how ’Urf influenced this field’s legislation 
and  its application in the Ottoman era.  
B. Development of Islamic Legal History – Shari’a and Seyasa, and 
Misconceptions  
Al imam Al-Shaf’y, in his treaties Al-Risala, instituted a mode of mediating between 
reason and revelation. He argued in his book that even though the law already exists 
in the divine Quran, Sunnah and Ijma’, human reasoning plays a pivotal role in 
determining the law within the divine sources or even by extending the rules already 
existing to other questions through reasoning or qias.
35
 
The relationship between the Shari’a and Seyasa, has a significant historical 
importance, as it has been perceived as a separation of powers. As previously 
mentioned, Shari’a only existed in the personal realm and the Seyasa in the public 
one. First, it should be clear that there has always been, on some level, a form of 
separation in the Islamic legal thought. But the new laws that were passed by the 
                                                        
32 Id at 16.  
33 Id at 16.  
34 AMIRA AL AZHARY SONBOL, THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT, CASE STUDIES 
IN ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, 89 (Asifa Quraishi, Frank E. Vogel, Harvard University Press 2008) 
(2008).  
35 SHALAKANY, supra note 28, at 13.  
  9 
Khedives never ignored the Shari’a in their rulings. However they complemented each 
For example, the Qada’ and Seyasa; in the case of homicide; and the Shari’a principle 
of pardoning the defendant is considered to be inadequate in a modern state, given the 
public security concerns. 
36
 Here, it was decided to leave the Shari’a to the personal 
claims of the victim or of his heirs, and the public claims handled by the Seyasa.
37 
Everything that is Shari’a is not Seyasa and vice versa. And anything that relates to 
Seyasa is considered outside the realm of Islamic legal history.
38
 For example, 
Schacht in his book, Introduction to Islamic law, uses the terms Islamic law and 
Shari’a synonymously, with the definition of the Shari’a holding the meaning counter 
of the Seyasa. 
So far, the common narrative is as follows: Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 
leads to a series of legal reforms, which resulted in a full-scale replacement of the 
Shari’a law in the year 1883.39 Two thinkers have challenged this whole narrative, 
Khaled Fahmy and Rudolph Peter offering a radical rethinking of the Egyptian legal 
development. Their revelation leads to two important findings: first, that there were 
Egyptian criminal law reforms in the first three quarters of the nineteenth century that 
were merely a continuation of the Ottoman tradition of legislation through qanun and 
not the result of Westernization.
40
  Second, these reforms were not considered a 
departure from Islamic law; rather they were a legal development rooted in the 
doctrine of Seyasa Shariyya.
41
   
C. Development of Islamic Legal History – Seyasa and Other Developments 
 
The development of the Seyasa Shariyya during the Islamic Empire first emerged 
with the emergence of the Islamic empire as a military power. The Islamic empire 
                                                        
36 Khaled Fahmy, The Anatomy of Justice; Forensic Medicine and Criminal Law in Nineteenth-
Century , the Egypt, ABB. 263,  6, 2, lieden, 1999, available at http://www.jstore.org/stable/3399313, 
263. 
37 Id.  
38 SHALAKANY, supra note 28 at 16.  
39 Id at 74.  
40 Id at 74. 
41 Id at 74.  
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attempted to expand their wealth and geographic advantage. Under the Abbasids from 
750 to 850CE, the Caliphs sought to establish their power through the enforcement of 
the Shari’a. During this period the madhaheb flourished, and the qadis were officially 
instructed to adjudicate in accordance with the madhaheb.
42
 Yet, the Abbasids failed 
in their quest. They failed to apply the Shari’a to public law, especially the criminal 
law. In this area of law, the Abbasids adopted some administrative procedural rules 
that originated in the pre-Islamic era in order for the caliph to settle the disputes for 
which normative legitimacy are found to be outside the Fiqh and Shari’a.43 These 
administrative procedures were known as Mazalim and Muhtasib.  
Under the Mazalim, the caliph heard and investigated issues ranging from the denial 
of justice to unlawful administrative acts. This procedure continued to grow and 
developed into a more formal court setting throughout the Ottoman  era.
44
  The same 
happened with the muhtasib, or the inspector, who would inspect a wide range of 
issues from theft, to administrative issues. That too, survived throughout the Ottoman 
era, which developed in the police force, as we know them now. 
45
 According to 
Schacht, this is when Seyasa Shariyya was developed, even though the Seyasa 
Shariyya was not fully developed until the thirteenth century during the Mamluk era. 
The Abbasids developed a way to fuse the Seyasa and the Fiqh by granting the caliph 
the attributes of a scholar to bind him to the sacred law. 
46
 Along with the 
development of the Mazalim and the Muhtasib came the qanun. The sultans from the 
fifteenth century issued the quawaneen. It was believed that the sultans aimed to 
conform the qanun with Islamic Shari’a; And, in some cases to complement the 
Shari’a. A case at hand: is the Ottoman qanun which developed different punishments 
for zina or adultery. These newly developed  “Zina” laws were only applied in cases 
where suspects could not be convicted under the rules of the Shari’a; For example 
fines were used as a form of punishment.
47
 This clearly contradicts the Shari’a 
punishment for adultery, which was specified to be stone throwing and whipping.  
                                                        
42 Id at 17.  
43 Id at 17. 
44 Id at 18. 
45 Id at 18.  
46 Id at 18.  
47 Id at 22. 
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Khaled Fahmy in his book Law, Medicine and Society in the Nineteenth-Century 
Egypt argues that members of the society in the nineteenth century, in both the urban 
and the rural areas, understood the differences between the Shari’a and the Seyasa. 
For instance, they were aware that the medical evidence including the autopsy was 
imperative to the legal applications.
48
 Fahmy further states in his book that:   
Nowhere do we see people confusing al-siyasa with "secular law," or thinking that 
there was a fundamental clash between it and the Shari'a, a legal system that was only 
later in the century and in much twentieth-century "modernization theory" literature, 
referred to as a defunct, obsolete religious law that had to give way to the rational, 
"modem" legal codes imported from Europe. Indeed, an analysis of the reasons for 
which people approached the police shows that the police with their siyas’a laws were 
often thought of as a means by which people could achieve what they understood as 
their Shari’a rights.49 
Fahmy discusses the majalis themselves, and how they dealt with the Shari’a, stating:  
What becomes clear from these cases is that, in spite of applying new         
legislations passed by the Khedives, the majalis were not ignoring the Shari'a in their 
rulings. As demonstrated, these laws themselves were often referring to the 
Shari'a....
50
 
Hence, a dual system of criminal justice did exist in the nineteenth century, and prior 
to the 1883 reforms.
51
 There were councils that were responsible for the application of 
the Qanun, and the qadi courts that were responsible for trying offenses such as 
homicide, sexual offenses, and assaulting. It was often that the same case would go 
through both systems.
52
 The cases would be heard first in the qadi court, and often 
referred to the council, as cases were rarely found for the plaintiff due to the strict 
rules of procedure and evidence in applying the Qanun.
53
 Rudolph Peters, comments 
on this dual system by arguing that the legitimacy rested on the Seyasa principles.
54
 
These laws were regarded Seyasa. Their aim was to unify and rationalize the judicial 
                                                        
48 Id at 77.  
49 Id at 77. 
50 Id at 77. 
51 Id at 76. 
52 Id at 76. 
53 Id at 76. 
54 Id at 76. 
  12 
administration and were never regarded as laws that circumvent the Shari’a laws, 
rather ones that complement the already existing legal system.
55
  
As a result of these legal developments, the Egyptian legal system acquired a 
distinctive form. As if Egypt was an independent nation, despite the fact that, at that 
time, the country was officially part of the Ottoman Empire.
56
 Even the dynamics of 
the majalis illustrate the interconnected relationship between the Shari’a and the 
Seyasa. Even in the majils structure itself, the mixture could be easily noted. The 
majalis el Shari’a would be resided over by a Shafi’y or a Hanafy judge, who was 
appointed by the grand mufti, who in turn was appointed by the Khedive.
57
 The 
secular majalis would examine cases after they had been passed to them by the 
Shari’a majalis, and the judges would not pass rulings that would contradict the 
Shari’a majalis ruling.58 Another example of how Shari’a and the Seyasa have always 
been considered complementary to each other is found in a book written by an 
Egyptian forensic medical examiner, Muhammad El Shubasi: He instructs his student 
to properly examine the causes of death as each cause would have different 
retroactions in the Shari’a, like whether homicide would require qasas or not.59  
In conclusion, there has always been development in Islamic legal history. It has been 
demonstrated that the legal development was gradual and pre-dated the Napoleonic 
invasion and had a pure Egyptian flavor to it. Does that mean that the modern 
European development had no bearing whatsoever on the Egyptian development? No, 
as the Egyptian legal system was influenced by the “less enlightened aspect” of the 
European development,
60
 which will be examined in the second chapter of this paper.  
The Seyasa and the Shari’a’s relationship has a significant importance to the 
conclusions of this paper, and to the conclusion that personal status laws inspired by 
Shari’a today are not solely based on religion.  It has also been made clear that there 
has always been a connection between Shari’a and Seyasa as both have 
                                                        
55 FAHMY, supra note 29,at 131. 
56 Id at 132. 
57 Id at 264. 
58 Id at 264. 
59 Id at 266. 
60 FAHMY, supra note 35, at 226. 
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complemented each other. Regardless of what has been written in history books, there 
has always been development, and there has always been human made laws to 
complement the Shari’a laws; This is important to understand to answer to those who 
call for the return of Shari’a.61  
D. The Modernist elite and the nineteenth century development 
of Egypt’s personal status law 
 
This section will examine the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century. When the decision was made to dispose of most of Egypt’s laws 
and replace them with new laws.
62
 It will also examine the different players that came 
to the legal scene and how they contributed to the current legal reality. Mainly, this 
section will discuss the role of the secular nationalist elite in this process.
63
 In addition 
to the impact of the process of codification on the personal status laws. And finally, it 
will examine the role of the Supreme Constitutional Court and how it deals with 
personal status issues.    
During the second half of the nineteenth century, there was opposition to the 
“Europeanization” process. This opposition came from the religious elite, as they 
were called at the time. To those religious figures the last straw represented the family 
law.
64
  Europeanization also represented a problem for the caretakers of this reform. 
In the event they would change the entire legal system into a more secular legal 
system, family law would have to go through those same changes as well, in order for 
it to be interpreted and used by secular judges in the courts of law.
65
 In order for 
secularization to take place, there had to be a limit drawn on any reform that could 
affect the family law. That was necessary to appease the religious constituency.
66
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During this era two types of elite were present on the legal scene. The first one was 
composed of Muhammad Abdu and Rashid Rida.
67
 This group proposed an 
alternative method of reform that was based on the maslaha or the public interest,
68
 
and, as Lama Abu-Odeh describes it, the concept of the  “supra-madhab”. Which 
Muhammad Abdu explains it as the state’s ability to adopt rules from all madhaheb 
and to not be confined to one specific madhab. 
69
 They proposed that the doctrine of  
public interest would replace the qyas or analogy.
70
 Hence, when a particular question 
regarding a social need arose that was not covered by a specific divine text, the jurist 
should respond to this question or need based on the public interest or maslaha.
71
 As 
far as the second proposition, this group proposed that the state should not restrict 
itself to the rules of one madhab, rather the state should be free to attend to its needs 
through accessing all the madhaheb.
72
 
The second group of elite was the secular nationalist male elite, this group was 
composed of European educated lawyers, or lawyers who had obtained their degrees 
from the national Egyptian universities yet studied the European civil codes. These 
lawyers were influenced by the European civil law and introduced new concepts such 
as the constitutional rights and so on.
73
 For the new nationalist elite capitulation 
became a symbol of the violation of the Egyptian sovereignty and a form of 
oppression, not modernization. Sanhuri the Egyptian jurist that was assigned to draft 
the new civil code belonged to this group.
74
 
Both groups had to cope with the existence and demands of the other. Sanhuri had to 
face the “Islamic modernizers” demands for a role in the newly reformed legal 
system.
75
 He attempted to reconcile both Islamic law and European law; His 
intervention was based on the concept of the “social” rather than the individual.76 
Sanhuri claimed that the new concept of the “social” which was newly developed by 
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the French sociological school of jurisprudence was what the Islamic jurisprudence 
was already built on.
77
  
The nationalist elite even aimed at drafting a family code that would apply to both 
Muslims and Copts equally.
78
 They aimed at a universal code that applied to all 
citizens.
79
 Yet in this new attempt Sanhuri failed to incorporate family law in the new 
consolidated civil code.
80
 The significance of this attempt lies in the insight it 
provides on how the elite regarded the status of the family law.  The nationalist elite 
desired to overcome the sectarian nature of the family law. They anticipated that the 
inclusion of family law in the civil code would give the family law the same 
universality as the civil code, and thus be applied to all citizens. The sectarian family 
laws represented the pre-nationalist era where different groups within the society 
apply different laws.
81
 The closest they ever got to including the Taqlid family law in 
to the new civil code, was to include the Taqlid qadi into the national court system in 
1955.
82
 
E. Codification 
 
Through the process of modernization, the Shari’a law was codified as part of the 
march towards centralization.  Codification as a general concept seems to be logical; 
it should provide for stability, transparency, and justice to all. Yet, in the case of 
Islamic jurisprudence, the effects of the codification could be contested. The 
codification of the Shari’a resulted in the mummification of the Shari’a and Fiqh. in 
doing so its most valuable aspect was lost, the connection the Shari’a laws had to  
society’s needs, and the flexibility that the Shari’a law had in applying its rules. Since 
the codification, the Shari’a law, and along with it women’s rights, lost their 
contemporary essence, and were trapped in the nineteenth century. Given the nature 
of the Shari’a and the Fiqh, the codification resulted in setting aside a big portion of 
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the Shari’a law contents.83 
 
To be able to fully comprehend the magnitude of the transformation of the Shari’a 
law through codification, it is necessary to understand the nature of the code itself and 
whether the Shari’a fits into its frame or not. Wael Hallaq in his article What is 
Shari’a? As agreed with the legal experts that “ the code come to replace all previous 
inconsistent customs, morals and laws”84 it must as well be, complete, exclusive, clear 
to produce both order and authority. Modern laws always claim superiority over any 
other form of law, and in the event that a pre-existenting law is still in effect, it is only 
through the permission of modern law and on its terms and conditions.  
 
Modern laws should not only be declaratory but also universal and individualistic in 
nature. There has to be conformity in the law’s application. The Shari’a by contrast, 
does not claim exclusive authority. On the contrary it depends on the customs and the 
cultures of the societies. The Shari’a law has always worked with, actually to be more 
precise intertwined with societal customary law. The Shari’a as a law was not 
declaratory, as it does not announce itself to be the exclusive authority and come to 
replace all other orders. The Shari’a, claimed no internal uniformity, which is why it 
was able to sustain its diversity and flexibility. This feature in particular is what aided 
the Shari’a to accommodate the different societal changes. This accommodation 
helped with the pluralism that depended on an individualistic idea.
85
 In the end, the 
modern attempts, the codification of the Shari’a law and the Fiqh resulted in creating 
a legal system that has little resemblance to its original form: a new legal system that 
unfortunately lacks its main characteristics, most importantly the flexibility of its pre-
codified legal system.  
 
Another aspect of the codification of the personal status law is the passive effect it 
had through dropping it from the civil code. It meant that the legislator left the 
personal status law to the Taqlid law in its transformed form. The Taqlid law has also 
been transformed by modernization and through the entrenchment of the “supra 
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madhab”. Furthermore it also meant that the religious ‘Ulama came to be attached to 
the personal status law as the last realm, where they still can exercise their power.
86
  
 
Women’s rights were especially affected by the codification of the personal status 
laws. The personal status issues post-codification are adjudicated in national courts 
applying the Hanafy madhab. Judges would strictly apply the Hanafy madhab.
87
 Pre-
codification, the personal status issues were adjudicated in Shari’a courts were the 
qadi had a wide range of both jurisdiction and discretion i.e. the Shari’a courts 
adjudicated civil, criminal, and administrative affairs, in addition to the personal 
status issues.
88
 The qadi would have the discretion not to adhere to the strict rules of 
the Hanafy madhab, and explore all the jurisprudential schools for a solution to the 
issue at hand. The qadi’s would apply an uncodified form of Shari’a usually infused 
with the changing social realities of his communities.
89
 This was particularly 
beneficial to women in obtaining their rights. For example; women were able to 
obtain a no fault divorce or khul’, which was only applied in Egypt in 2000.90 Qadi’s 
could use their discretion to stray from the predominant interpretation of the Shari’a. 
In various cases when the qadis would aim to proving the marriage consummation for 
the purpose of establishing the woman’s rights, they would allow the martial meetings 
after the contract signing, which is a clear contradiction to the Shari’a rule of legal 
privacy.
91
  
The codification of the family laws in general has transformed the way the law 
operates.
92
 Personal status laws lost their flexibility, which negatively affected 
women’s position in the family.   
F. Egypt’s Contemporary Judicial Elite 
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In contemporary Egypt, there are a number of examples of the strategy that the male 
elite follows in dealing with women’s issues. In the fight for their legal equality in the 
family, women had several demands: equal access to divorce, the abolishment of 
polygamy, increase of financial rights and the elimination of child marriage. Of 
course the religious elite would always respond to these demands being a trespass on 
their “God-given rights”.93 Following their strategy to indirectly deal with the issues, 
the male elite would not, as legislators and judges, abolish polygamy but rather 
restrict it.
94
 They would not equalize the right of divorce but rather grant more 
grounds for divorce.
95
  
This strategy is evident in some of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and the 
Supreme Administrative Court rulings. The following cases demonstrate this strategy:    
In 1994, the constitutional court ruled on the constitutionality of a divorce. The 
plaintiff was the soon to be ex-husband. He was contesting the constitutionality of 
certain provisions No. 11 of 1929, which provided for a wife’s right to divorce based 
on harm resulting from taking another wife. He argued that law No. 11 of the year 
1929 contradict the second Article of the Egyptian constitution, which confirms that 
the Islamic Shari’a is the principal source of legislation. The court’s ruling was in 
favor of the defendant.   
What is interesting here is not the ruling, but the reasoning. The court argued that law 
No. 11 does not contradict with the Shari’a, and added that the concept of harm is 
entrenched in the Shari’a. The court cited verses from the Quran and the Sunnah to 
provide proof of the existence of the concept of harm. And Hence, it concluded that a 
law allowing divorce based on the concept of harm does not defy the Shari’a rules. 
The court in its argument and reasoning depended on the Quran and Sunnah to 
confirm the right of the woman in divorce.
96
  
Another case brought before the constitutional court, contested the validity of the 
education ministry’s decision, no 113 for the year 1994. The decision stated the 
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guidelines for girls’ dress code in public schools. The guidelines stipulate that in order 
for the girls to wear the Higab, permission has to be granted from her parents. The 
father of two girls contested the constitutionality of the law after a school rejected his 
daughters for wearing the Niqab. The father contested the law based on the freedom 
of religion and the non-conformity with Article 2 of the constitution. The Court ruled 
for the constitutionality of the decision by distinguishing between the principle of the 
Shari’a and the rules of the Shari’a. Rules are open for different interpretation. 
Applying it to the case, the court stated that there is no clear rule to stipulating the 
permission of the Niqab. The court stated that covering the girls face would hinder her 
from interacting with society, which the principles of the Shari’a never stipulated.97  
In third and final example, the Supreme Administrative Court assumed a similar 
stance in 1997. In July 1996, the Ministry of Health issued a decree no 261/1996 that 
forbade in its first article the female gentile mutilation (FGM) both in public and in 
private. FGM has been entrenched in religion through opinions of some of the jurists, 
and is a widespread cultural practice.
98
 It’s a wide spread practice in Egypt 
unfortunately. The decree was contested by Islamist: sheikh Youssef el Badri in the 
administrative court. The Administrative Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the 
ruling was contested later by the Ministry of health in the supreme administrative 
court. The Supreme Administrative court ruled against the previous administrative 
court decision upholding the decree to forbid the practice of FGM. In this example, 
the court’s ruling was based on several questions: What is the legal basis for the 
mutilation of women’s bodies? How far is this issue related to Islamic principles? 
And finally, is the plaintiff entitled to raise this issue? Similar to its counterpart, the 
court held the right to interpret the principle of Shari’a and to determine what is it 
within the customs that is considered in conformity with the Islamic religion.
99
  
The Supreme Constitutional Court has the power of statutory interpretation and 
judicial review; where by the court ascertains and reaffirms the true intent of the 
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legislator.
100
 It is  the constitutional court’s role to make sure that any legislation is in 
conformity with the constitutional law.
101
 It is clear that the SCC, since the 1980 
constitution and its Article 2, has been trying to compromise between the Islamic 
enthusiasts and feminists. By always taking an intermediate position between the 
two.
102
  
In conclusion, the first chapter has demonstrated through the historical development 
of the Shari’a and its applications, that there has never been a strict adherence to the 
rules of the Shari’a. The Shari’a rules themselves can be adjusted and amended 
according to societal changes. Also it was argued that the codification process 
stripped the Shari’a of one of its main characteristics namely its flexibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II- The Current Personal Status Law 
This Chapter will specifically discuss two integral issues in the personal status law, 
divorce and child custody. It will also highlight the main differences between the 
Shari’a and the modern personal status law to demonstrate, in concrete terms, that the 
personal status law was influenced by more than just the Shari’a; which makes the 
law in some respects even inconceivable to be associated it. This chapter will discuss 
two main points: The first is the different philosophical approaches to gender, law, 
                                                        
100 Id at 4. 
101 Id at 3. 
102 LAMA, supra note 62, at 1144. 
  21 
and the application of the law itself. The second is the divorce legislation, and child 
custody legislation.  
A. Modern Law and Patriarchy 
One of the main differences between the pre-modern legal system based on the 
Shari’a and the modern personal status law, is the philosophical approach to gender 
and law. There is a patriarchal approach to the modern personal status law that did not 
exist in the pre modern era. This section will examine this point further.  
 
A court in 1937 defined the personal status as follows: 
By personal status is meant the totality of what differentiates one human being 
from another in natural or family characteristics according to which the law 
based legal principles in regards to his social life such as if the human being is 
male or female, if he is married or widower, a divorce, a father, or legitimate 
son, or if he is a full citizen or less due to his age or imbecility or insanity, or 
if he is fully civilly competent, or is controlled in his competency due to a 
legal reason.
103
 
The modern definition of  personal status law has taken a different approach to human 
interaction in the society. It viewed the citizens through certain characteristics, sole as 
being male, female. and through certain needs that resulted in an unequal system that 
placed the control with the capable i.e. male over the less capable i.e. women and 
children. The biological difference becomes a liability denying women their 
competence. This difference happened incrementally; starting from the year 1885 
where the first reformed law focused on regulating marriage.
 104
  
The fundamental principles of marriage, divorce and the relationship between men 
and women is set out in the Quran. Yet, the details that surround those principles 
often depend on customs and ’Urf. For example, the compatibility of the spouses is 
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set in the Quran, yet the dowry and the property depends on the customs of the 
country and the city where the union is taking place.
105
 
With the beginning of the Ottoman modernity, women were affected in two ways, the 
first was that the Ottoman state developed a sense of state hegemony. And the modern 
state institutions and legal structures took a different form. Along with this 
development, the patriarchy developed as well.
106
 It is evident in the marriage 
contracts that date back to the sixteenth century in which wives were able to introduce 
certain conditions into the marriage contract. For example; the wife might have a 
condition in the marriage contract that would allow her to divorce her husband’s 
future wives.
107
 Those conditions have no parallel in the modern marriage contracts 
today.  
Secondly,  development, ,took place under the imperial powers. Laws that pertain to 
women’s rights were influenced by the new borrowed nineteenth century European 
codes.
108
 The influence was found for example in the newly definition of marriage: “a 
contract between a man and a women by which she is lawfully to him with the object 
of forming and family and producing children”.109 This definition and the concept of 
marriage for the production of children, was foreign to the Egyptian legal and social 
discourse.  
Hence this era introduced to the Egyptian society new forms of modernization. Banks, 
schools, and universities were all based on systems and codes borrowed from the 
French and British codes.
110
 The new modern schools and universities taught new 
concepts related to gender that were promoted by the elite and the middle class of 
Egypt.
111
  
A Napoleonic code was borrowed and applied to the Egyptian legal system. Although 
this code was not directly applied in the Shari’a courts, it had direct effects on 
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women’s rights in marriage and divorce and created a patriarchal structure for the 
Egyptian family.
112
  
The patriarchal characteristics of the Napoleon code could be detected in the 
amendments of the 1885 law that focused on “marriage”, and the amendments that 
took place in the 1920s that changed “marriage” to “family”.113 The shift is significant 
as the first amendment focused on marriage that entailed two persons and their 
respective rights, while the second law just focuses on the family’s interests as a 
unit.
114
  
The Napoleon code reads as follows:  
The Napoleon code […] is especially based on the rights and authority of the 
husband as chief of the family, and on the respect, which has to be paid to him 
by his wife and children. The husband is considered to be the best able to 
manage the family fortunes, and that respect and in his capacity as head of the 
family, the rights given to him sometimes override those of his wife and 
children.
115
 
The modern scholars sought to relate the new concepts laid out in the code to the 
Islamic Shari’a, through the ideas of obedience and superiority. This code was later 
adopted and translated into law directly affecting the right of women to divorce, as 
will be seen later in detail.116 But its important to note here that this Code was the 
beginning of the requirement of the husbands consent to divorce. It was also the root 
of requiring the wife to prove harm if she wanted a divorce without the consent of the 
husband. Moreover, in order for the wife to prove harm, she had to be confined to a 
list of behaviors by the husband to be granted a divorce. For example, the wife has to 
prove bodily harm, or that her husband was impotent and in that case the divorce was 
not even granted immediately, a period of a year had to be given for the husband to 
cure himself or provide proof that her husband has not been supporting her, which is 
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difficult to prove.
117
 All of this is far from the divorce rights the women enjoyed 
before the introduction of these patriarchal laws. 
Another example of the damaging effect of the new patriarchal law is the 
guardianship laws in Egypt. Under the new modern laws, the mother has no right to 
guardianship over the person or property, yet the father or grandfather can select her 
as a trustee.
118
  This is contrary to the pre modern laws, whereby the qadi including 
the Hanafy qadis would always grant the mother the guardianship over her children 
and their property if she so wished. Following the modernization, even if the mother 
was granted the right of guardianship over life and property, a male guardian has to be 
appointed and has authority over her actions.
119
  
Patriarchy even took a greater form than just the husband in the household. In 1974 a 
mother sued for an extension of the custody of her daughter until the daughter got 
married. This is valid under the Maliky madhab, which is not the madhab applied in 
Egypt. The Hanafy madhab is the one applied in Egypt, which mandates that girls 
should be under the father’s guardianship from the age of twelve. The plaintiff based 
the argument on the unconstitutionality of the law using only the Hanafy madhab 
when the constitution didn’t specify a certain madhab to be applied. The case was 
dismissed by the judge claiming that the Mushar’ or law drafter chose the Hanafy law 
to be applied in Egypt and since he is the guardian of the state, his authority cannot be 
questioned.
120
  
Another example of the influence of the Napoleon Code and its patriarchal 
philosophy is found in the citizenship laws, which entailed the denial of the female 
citizen her right to pass her nationality to her children, unlike her male counterpart.
121
 
This law has since been abolished in Egypt, but only in the year 2004.   
There are thousands of court cases from the eighteenth and the nineteenth century that 
were not used as a reference in the codification process or even later made accessible 
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to the judges for reference.
122
 The judges themselves were trained using different 
procedures and sources, which was logical since the law itself was completely 
different.  
Sticking to the same example of the marriage contract, the striking difference between 
the pre-and the post modernization marriage contracts is that the former was open to 
the inclusion of the conditions, such as the wife’s refusal of the husband’s taking 
another wife, or the husband stating that the wife can not leave the house without his 
permission. The marriage contract deteriorated over time. In the third year of Hijra the 
contracts showed great flexibility in the conditions and the demands of women. While 
from the Ottoman rule period and the introduction of the patriarchal codes that took 
place at the beginning of the modernization. The contracts showed rigidity in their 
stipulated conditions.
123
  
Another example of the great difference between Shari’a law and the modern 
personal status law is the concept of obedience; the original concept of obedience 
revolves around the husband providing for his wife, and the wife in return being  
obedient to him. In pre-modern Shari’a it as a negotiating matter not in absolute 
terms.
124
 Pre modernization, the obedience meant the husband would ask his wife not 
to leave the house without his permission: The wife had a choice of either abiding by 
her husband’s wishes or getting out of the marriage. It was only in the modernization 
era when the concept of obedience developed into full obedience to the husband in 
addition to what is called the house of obedience. In the 1920, the state, as part of its 
new responsibility in protecting the family, had jurisdiction to apprehend the wife 
where she refused to return to the marital house. It was shocking to learn that the full 
obedience, and the house of obedience never existed in the Islamic world before the 
modernization era. In fact, the origin of this law is the Victorian philosophy and 
values. The law existed in Great Britain until the twentieth century under the principle 
of the covertures, which allowed the husband to lock up his wife to insure the marital 
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relationship.
125
  This new form of obedience was not only applied to Muslim women, 
but Christian women as well in the law 25 of the year 1920, amended in the years 
1929,1979,1985. 
126
 Another example shows that modern laws have been influenced 
by societal change and the modernization era and the adoption of the European codes, 
and in some instances not even influenced by the Islamic Shari’a. 
B. Divorce and Child Custody  
 
The legislation governing child custody and divorce has been chosen as part of the 
thesis to demonstrate that legislation continued to evolve. From the nineteenth century 
up until the attempts at modernizing legislation. This evolution has sometimes been 
influenced by the Islamic Shari’a, and at other times influenced by international 
concepts or societal needs. The difference is the players influencing the change and 
the factors they used to form these changes. 
127
 To elaborate, the state as a player and 
an influencer had little to do with the legislation applied in courts in the nineteenth 
century; major influencers in molding legislation were culture and traditions.
128
 This 
is as opposed to the changes in the pre-modern era, when the state was the sole 
manipulator of legislation.
129
  
 
 
1.Child Custody 
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The child custody legislation during the Ottoman rule and its application in courts, as 
in other legislations, was unique in its flexibility.
130
 Yet in no point in time did the 
courts apply any code using any framework other than the Islamic Shari’a law.131 
This unique combination of using the Shari’a law framework and being flexible at the 
same time, led to different laws being applied depending on the time, place and 
’Urf.132  
To further illustrate, during the Ottoman rule, the public could pick and choose the 
madhab they wished to apply to their dispute. Certain patterns could be detected from 
this method. Despite the Hanafy being the official madhab of the Ottoman Empire, 
the Egyptian public, both in lower and Upper Egypt, preferred the Maliky and the 
Shaf”y madhaheb. Yet in 1897, after a round of legal reforms, the Hanafy madhab 
was established as the main source of Islamic laws in Egypt.
133
 
Under the Ottoman rule the place and the ’Urf played a major role and influence in 
the Shari’a court. As mentioned above, the public was free to choose from the 
madhab, and hence the Shari’a courts were still applying the Malaky and Shaf’y 
madaheb.
134
 This diverse legal system allowed the judges more freedom in the 
interpretation of the madaheb and in creatively finding solutions to issues that might 
not be covered by the Hanafy madhab.
135
 The ’Urf also affected the judges in anther 
sense. The judges were trained and educated by Al Azhar or similar schools like the 
Salihiyya al-Nijmiyya and certified to provide the public with Fatway. It was quite 
common for those judges to reside over courts in their native areas were they were 
familiar with the ’Urf and customs of the people.136    
2.Child custody in contemporary Egypt 
This section will explore state intervention and how it affects the law, in addition to 
the adoption of new concepts that are totally foreign to the Shari’a. 
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Issues relating to the custody and guardianship of minors occur during or after the 
dissolution of marriage. In Islamic law the custody and guardianship of minors is 
separated into the physical custody of minors and guardianship over their property.
137
 
In broad terms, the guardianship of children resides with the father from birth to 
maturity. Yet, after the dissolution of marriage, and the separation of parents, the 
physical custody, or the hadana, is granted to the mother.
138
 If for any reason the 
mother is not capable of caring for the child during the hadana, the custody is 
transferred first to the maternal grandmother, then followed by the paternal side of the 
family starting with the paternal grandmother and so on.
139
    
The hadina has to enjoy certain basic qualities to qualify. She has to be sane and 
capable of caring for the child. Yet in the event the hadina remarried to a stranger, 
someone not related to the child and whomthe child could marry. during the years of 
the hadana, custody is automatically transferred to the next in line.
140
   
Basing laws on the Hanafy doctrine is a tool by the state to establish its hegemony on 
the family and gender relations.
141
 According to the Hanafy doctrine, the age the 
hadana ends is when boys turn seven and the girls turn nine. Then the custody is 
transferred to the father.
142
 The Shaf’y and the Hanbaly share the same view, yet the 
Maliky only shared their age limit when it came to boys as for girls he extended the 
custody till marriage.
143
 This age limit has changed though subsequent law 20 of the 
year 1929 which stipulates, “that a divorced mother is entitled to custody of a child 
until the age of 10 in the case of a son and until the age of twelve in the case of a 
daughter, but the judge may extend custody to fifteen years for a son and until 
marriage for a daughter”.144 This was the condition that the judge would deem the 
prolongation of the hadana period, in the best interest of the child.
145
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In 1985, feminists were able to claim a little victory for themselves when they 
succeeded in incorporating the Maliky provisions in the law 100 of the year 1985, 
extending the hadana age from nine to ten for boys, and twelve years of age for girls; 
this is while the mother receives a custody fee from the father.  The judge in this case 
would have discretion to extend the hadana for the boys till the age of fifteen and the 
girls till marriage.
146
 Article 20 of the law 25 of the year 1929, also amended by law 
no 100 of the year 1985 provided both parents with the right to visit their children. 
The court has the right to intervene in case the parents do not agree on a frequency to 
meet or on a venue. This law is in perfect conformity with Article 9 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which stipulates the importance of the courts intervention 
to maintain the child’s relationship with the child’s parents except if it is contrary to 
the child’s best interest.147  
Yet, law 100 of the year 1985 differentiated between the age by which the minor boy 
and minor girl’s custody would be transferred to the father. And Based on this 
discrimination in March 2005 Article 20 of the law was amended to equate both 
genders. The hadana hence was extended for both genders till the age of fifteen. The 
new law also canceled the automatic transfer of custody to the father; instead the 
judge would have to consider the preferences of the children.
148
 Furthermore, Article 
70 of the law no 1 of the year 2000, allows the public prosecutor to intervene in 
disputes  concerning the custody until the courts ruling resolves the dispute.
149
  
The marriage of minors in custody is one of the issues that has evolved over time and,  
whose practice has drastically changed.
150
  Welayet el ijbar, provided the guardian 
with the power to marry his minor children, girls and boys at any age.
151
 The 
madhaheb were different in granting marriage guardianship over the minors: Shaf’y 
and Hanafy school extended it to the grandfather, the Hanafy school to the brother, 
and the Maliky school to the Kafil. Yet, the marriage contracts arranged by the father 
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of his minor children, were not to be contested in courts as opposed to the marriage 
contracts arranged by other guardians.
152
 
During the personal status law reforms that took place in the twentieth century 
particularly in the year 1931, raising the age of marriage by law was hailed by 
feminists as a great success. Before this amendment, the guardians were able to marry 
minors at any age. The law required a minimum marriage age of sixteen for girls and 
eighteen for boys.
153
  
The reforms that took place in the twentieth century were assumed to have been based 
on the Hanafy madhab, the predominant madhab in Egypt at the time.
154
 But different 
madhaheb were predominant in different areas of the country before the reforms of 
the 1880. In the 1880, a committee selected by the state was given permission to 
choose from the Hanafy madhab the most acceptable interpretation. In addition, they 
were also allowed to search for other interpretations in other madhaheb for issues not 
included in the Hanafy madhab.
155
 Hence the laws that were applied in the twentieth 
century were selective laws. Before the reforms, different laws were applied to 
different parts of the country; and ’Urf was the factor that determined which law 
should be applied where.
156
  
 
3. Best interest of the child 
There were more amendments to the 1929 law. Law no 1 of the year 2000 and the 
year 2005, the law equated treatment between genders. The law stated that both girls 
and boys should stay in the hadina’s custody to the age of fifteen. What is special 
about this law is the cancellation of the automatic transfer of minors to their father, 
and the judge’s obligation to question the minor’s preference as to whom she or he 
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would like to live with.
157
 The significance of this amendment lies in the legislators’ 
consideration of the best interest of the child.
158
  
The legislators’ understanding of the concept has evolved through time. Before the 
previously mentioned amendments, the best interest of the child meant the child spent 
his first years with the mother then transferred to the father. Yet, after the 
amendments the concept was upheld through granting the mother the custody till the 
age of fifteen then involving the children in the custody decision.
159
 Even though the 
concept enjoys international consensus, it is highly subjective nature could lead to 
different outcomes depending on the cultural context and therefore different 
interpretations.
160
 This is demonstrated below with three different custody cases that 
showcase the impact of the progression of the law on women’s rights to custody.     
Case No 19 of the year 1985: 
There have been several custody battles concerning by the best interest of the child 
concept. In case No 19 of the year 1985, an Egyptian mother was fighting for the 
custody of her daughters. The father wished to have the custody of their two girls 
transferred to him after the mother married a “stranger”; under law this would 
disqualify the hadana of the mother. The judge dismissed the case basing his decision 
on the best interests of the children stating that the father travels for work which is a 
life style not in the girls best interest. The judge also commented on the mother’s 
marriage to a stranger being the lesser harm than the instability of the father’s 
lifestyle.
161
  
In Case No. 210 of the year 2004, before the 2005 amendments stated above, a father 
was suing his ex-wife for the custody of their two boys. The judge ruled that the 
mother should hand over the custody of her two boys to their father, and she was 
ordered to pay for all court expenses including the lawyers’.  
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The judge based his decision as follows: Since both the children reached the age of 17 
and 13 respectively, and as they have been in their mother’s custody and no longer in 
need of her care; and as it is in their best interest to be in their father’s custody, so that 
he can raise and take care of them. The first paragraph of law No 100, Article No 20 
from Law No 25 of the year 1929, amended by law No 100 of the year 1985 that 
states that the “mother’s right to custody ends as the son reaches the age of 10 and as 
the daughter reaches the age of 12, and it is allowed for the judge, after these ages, to 
keep the son till the age of 15 and the daughter until she gets married, without custody 
fees.
162
  
The following case was adjudicated after the amendment of the year 2005, case no 
211 of the year 2006: In this case the mother was suing for the custody of her 
children. As apparent from the court documents, the father had the physical custody 
of both children and prevented the mother from her lawful physical custody. The 
judge ruled that the children be given to the mother, and the father should pay for all 
administrative and lawyers’ fees. The judge based his ruling on; law No 100 Article 
No 20 from Law No 25 of the year 1929, which had its first part replaced by Article 
No 1 of the law No 4 of the year 2005, which stipulates that the mother’s custody 
ends when both son and daughter reach the age of 15; and it is allowed for the judge, 
after these ages, to keep the son till the age of maturity, and the daughter until she gets 
married without custody fees.
163
 
4. Divorce 
 
In the pre modern era, the unequal right to divorce was entrenched in marriage 
contracts. The man could unilaterally divorce his wife at will. Yet, in order for the 
wife to get a divorce she had to establish without a doubt to the judge her grounds for 
divorce. These grounds ranged from impotence, to violence, to non-support.
164
 If the 
wife was able to prove the above, and was granted the divorce by court it would be 
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called a “judicial” divorce. There was also the divorce by delegation, where by the 
husband delegated the right to divorce to his wife. This option was rarely used as it 
carried a social stigma, and it was also conditioned on the husband’s approval.165 The 
third course of action was divorce by khul’. 166  This was not even an option in 
Egyptian legislation till the year 2000. 
The Egyptian state has been unwilling to change the divorce legislation for the longest 
time.
167
 And it has impacted women of all classes. For example, in order for women 
to obtain a judicial divorce “tatliq”, she has to establish harm from her husband’s 
disappearance or imprisonment to the judge through evidence and at least two 
witnesses. And, even if the woman succeeds at providing the above, it would still take 
her eight to ten years to obtain the divorce not to mention the bureaucratic hassle of 
the court system and facing non-sympathetic judges which is both exhausting and 
costly.
168
  
In 1899, several feminists legal reformers and writers urged the state to intervene to 
help resolve the divorce epidemic in Egypt. The suggestion was for the state to limit 
the man’s right to unilaterally divorce his wife, and, only permit the man to divorce 
his wife before a judge. The Egyptian Feminists Union were the most vocal regarding 
the issue, and campaigned vigorously in the 1920s and 1930s None of the suggestions 
were legislated. Finally, the legislator responded with law no 25 of the year 1929. The 
legislator stated in the memorandum that they aimed at preserving the family life in 
Egypt through curbing the man’s unilateral right to divorce. The legislator also added 
that men where abusing their power contrary to the Islamic prescriptions of divorce 
being the last resort.
169
    
Law no 25 of the year 1929 declared the divorce invalid in certain circumstances such 
as intoxication, being under duress, or forcing the wife or a third party to commit a 
certain act, or refrain from committing a certain act. If a man utters several oaths at 
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once, it would only be counted as one oath. In certain conditions the divorce would be 
irrevocable; in the event it took place before consummation, or the divorce oath was 
uttered on three separate occasion. Or the divorce took place in exchange for 
money.
170
  
To legislate the law into limiting unilateral divorce the legislator had to bypass the 
Hanafy madhab by combining several principles from other madhaheb. They adopted 
minority legal opinions that were stricter of a man’s right to unilateral divorce.171 The 
second attempt at reform came in 1979 law no 44. It dealt with polygamy and 
established it as grounds for divorce.  The law stipulates that a husband marrying 
another wife without the first wife’s consent could be considered as harming the first 
wife, and could be granted an automatic divorce by the judge, provided she so 
requested within a year from the date she first knew about the marriage. 
172
The law 
declared that polygamy equates harm. And if the wife didn’t consent to the husband’s 
marriage, she could get a divorce within a year of her knowledge of his second 
marriage.
173
   
The law also tackled the issue of the woman’s knowledge of the divorce. Divorce 
under Sunni law is an “extra judicial-divorce” Meaning there is no need for a court’s 
intervention or any official documentation. The law required the man to document his 
divorce, yet it did not automatically give course to the consequences of the divorce 
except from the time of the wife’s knowledge of the divorce. The wife is to be 
considered notified if she attended the notification of the divorce, or was informed by 
a notification to her place of residence.
174
The third set of reforms in law 44 was  
mediation by court through which the court attempts to reconcile the couple. If the 
court failed within six months, the court would rule for divorce.
175
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This law was challenged immediately, and was deemed unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Constitutional Court in 1985. In same year law 100 of 1985 was discussed 
by parliament. Law no 100 was an amended version of its predecessor. The law 
reiterated the knowledge of the wife, and provided a limit of thirty days for the wife to 
be notified, and the consequence of the divorce to take place. Or, in case the husband 
hid the divorce from the wife, the consequences would take effect from the time of 
her knowledge.
176
   
The polygamy section of the law, had to be replaced by the requirement of the wife’s 
establishing the harm that affected her from the husband’s marriage.177 As for the 
third and last section of the law, the mediation between the couple was left 
unchanged.
178
  
This failure taught women a valuable lesson. Women’s rights groups learned that 
legal reform had to be initiated from the bottom up, rather than enforced from above, 
and reforms need to be a combination of a grass root mobilization and governmental 
support. It also emphasized the importance of having a religious framework for their 
future reforms.
179
  Rights groups since then have focused on two major projects: the 
Marriage contract and khul’ law.180 
5.Khul’ law 
 
a. Khul’ in the Ottoman era 
 
Khul’ divorce derives its legitimacy from the Sunnah. The wife of Thabbit ibn qays 
ibn shammaas came to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and said “oh 
messenger of Allah, I do not find any fault with Thabbit in his character or his 
religious commitment, but I do not want to commit any act of Kufr after becoming a 
Muslim.” The Prophet then asked her, will you give back his garden? The garden was 
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given to her as a dowry- and she replied yes. The Prophet then said to Thabbit; “ take 
your garden and divorce her.” This was narrated by Al-Bukhaari,5273.181 
There is also verse 1:229 of the Quran that stipulates:  
And it is not lawful for you that ye take from women aught of that which ye 
have given them; except (in the case) when both fear that they may not be able 
to keep within the limits (imposed by) Allah. And if ye fear that they may not 
be able to keep the limits of Allah, in the case it is no sin for wither of them if 
the woman ransom herself. 182 
During the Ottoman rule, most of the divorce cases that were brought to the Qadi 
were khul’ divorces, they were cases that involved a wife that wants to be granted a 
divorce without the consent of her husband.
183
 This type of divorce is different than 
talaq, where the wife has to establish harm to be granted divorce, and she is not 
required to relinquish her financial rights. During the Ottoman era almost all of the 
khul’ divorce cases were ruled in favor of the wife.184  
As will be seen later the khul’ divorce was never enacted in modern Egypt (19th 
century). It was never included in any amendment to the personal status law till the 
year 2000. The state’s intervention and conscious decision not to include this law in 
Egypt, despite the fact that the court records that date back to the Ottoman era, clearly 
indicate and confirm women have been able to divorce themselves, is a clear example 
of how the personal status laws have strayed over the years from its original form. 
Affected in this case by the state’s hegemony and control of the family, is the 
inequality towards women through consciously depriving them of the right to initiate 
divorce, the same as men.   
In 2000, the khul’ law was adopted by the parliament. As Law no 1 of the year 2000, 
Article 20 of the law granted women the right to an irrevocable divorce from the 
husband in exchange for the dower, and the forfeiting all of her financial rights.
185
 
Under this law the wife had to only express her desire to be divorced from her 
husband without proving harm. The husband’s consent to the divorce is irrelevant to 
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the procedures, yet the court mandates a reconciliation session that would not exceed 
three months, and if the couple had children then they would have to go through a 
second round of reconciliation that is thirty to sixty days apart from the first round.
186
 
It is safe to claim that enacting this law did not emanate from the need to resort to the 
Shari’a; Yet there was another need to promulgate new conditions and procedures to 
the litigation in matters of personal status law.
187
 The number of women that wait for 
years for a divorce ruling, and those who have failed in obtaining a divorce ruling 
were the main motivation for the parliament to enact such a law.
188
 
Law no 1 of the year 2000 is a perfect example of how the personal status law has 
been affected by patriarchy and the shift from religion emphasized in the objection to 
the law. With clear references in the Sunnah and Quran, in addition to preexisting 
case law from the Ottoman era, it still took the parliament five sessions of 
deliberations over the course of nine years of debates to enact the law. This provision 
was met by religious dissent from both the parliament members and the religious 
figures in Egypt.
189
 It also amplifies the patriarchal attitude the Egyptian society has 
towards personal status law.
190
 Some of the parliament members objected to the law 
based on its violation of the husband’s guardianship over women, claiming that it is a 
God given right to man provided in the Shari’a.191 
Some scholars in Al-Azhar and the Islamic Research Academy, a state sponsored 
research academy, objected to a certain aspect of Article 20 of the law. And in spite of 
their objection, the grand mufti declared the law to be in conformity with the Shari’a 
principles.
192
 The debate that took place regarding the provision was mainly based on 
whether or not the law was in conformity with the four Sunni jurisprudential schools. 
The Sunni schools unanimously agreed that the husband had to consent to the Khul’ 
procedures, as this form of divorce was considered a right of the husband not the 
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wife.
193
 Even after the approval of the grand mufti, the law was still being contested. 
Hence, the government had to amend the law, and introduce a mediation period, for 
the purpose of attempting to save the marriage, before granting the woman the 
divorce,
194
 this was in addition to abandoning other provisions in the law, in a form of 
quid pro quo, for the adoption of the Khul’ divorce.195  
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Conclusion  
This thesis has showcased that, contrary to Egypt’s formal educational messages, and 
in contrast to some of the scholars’ work, Shari’a was far from a stagnant and isolated 
source of laws. Since the beginning of Islamic legislation, the Qadis were often 
impacted by the changes in their community and society; ’Urf played a major role in 
molding the laws. In addition, Qadis had discretion in choosing from a wide range of 
jurisprudence. The sovereign intervention created “Seyasa Shariyya”; a secular tool 
that aimed at helping them pass laws. Later it became a full-fledged system that was 
infused with the Shari’a law complementing it and never replacing it. This is 
imperative to reply to those claiming that Shari’a has been applied exclusively; and 
needs to be applied exclusively. Gradually, and with the exposure to the colonial 
powers, even the personal status laws were altered and changed, sometimes in 
accordance with Shari’a and sometimes away from it. This paper also showcased the 
patriarchal impact of European laws namely the Napoleon Code had on the personal 
status law, and how negatively it affected women’s rights and gender relations.  
Questioning the personal status law and its origins is essential for the further 
development of the personal status law and women’s rights. It is essential to 
understand, that Shari’a was never solely adhered to. It became apparent that personal 
status laws, through the development of the divorce and the child custody legislation, 
were affected by the same factors that influenced the Shari’a. ‘ Urf, societal changes 
including European codes and societal needs such as soring divorce rates, affected 
personal status issues in the pre modern era, and drafting personal status laws in the 
post modern era. Thus, the Egyptian personal status law is a conglomerate of secular 
tools, social needs and changes infused with religion.  
  
